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INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent based simulations (MABS) have become one of the popular tools that help computer 
scientists to simulate multi-agent systems (MAS) without developing the actual system for 
simulating certain features. It aims to enhance the performance of MAS in terms of space 
complexity, time complexity and computational complexity. By defining the performance of 
MAS, the cooperation between autonomous agents in the society for expressing (Castelfranchi, 
1998; Sichman, Conte, Demazeau, & Castelfranchi, 1998) the need of depending on others. 
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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we introduce T-DepExp system to simulate the transitive dependence based coalition 
formation (CF). It is a multi-agent based simulation (MABS) tool that aims to enhance cooperation 
between agents through transitive dependence. Previously, the transitive dependence was introduced 
by An and his colleagues for expressing the indirect dependence between agents in their cooperation. 
However, it did not receive much attention. Although it has a few problems need to be addressed, we 
try to propose our own mechanism to increase the efficiency of the transitive dependence based CF. To 
simulate MAS dependence relationship, we have included two fundamental dependence relationships 
in this MABS tool, which are AND-Dependence and OR-Dependence. In addition, the architecture of 
the T-DepExp system is presented and discussed. It allows possible integration of other features such 
as budget mechanism and trust model. Subsequently, hypothesis for the experiments and experimental 
setup are explained. The overall system will be demonstrated for its functionality and the experimental 
results will also be discussed.
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This phenomenon is known as heterogeneous 
need among autonomous problem solvers in 
the society that leads to cooperation between 
agents. The cooperation formed between the 
agents in a group that are goal directed is 
known as a coalition.
Billy Pik Lik Lau, Ashutosh Kumar Singh and Terence Peng Lian Tan
106 Pertanika J. Sci. & Technol. 23 (1): 105 - 117 (2015)
Coalition is a goal-directed and short-lived organization and framework for agents to 
perform problem solving in a distributed manner (Sycara, 1998; Wooldridge, 2009). The 
cooperation between agents in coalition can be instant and dissolved when there is no common 
goal. Coalition formation (CF) is often viewed as an optimization problem for the cooperation 
between agents in problem solving. It offers a quick formation of group for tackling the dynamic 
environment of MAS. However, coalition suffers some of the limitations such as coalition 
formation is invisible (An, Shen, Miao, & Cheng 2007), where other agents are not aware 
of it. In order to address this drawback, social reasoning mechanism (Sichman et al., 1998; 
Gaspar & Morgado, 2000; Sichman & Demazeau, 2001) has been implemented to aid agents in 
identifying the social needs of dynamic coalition formation in a real-world agent environment.
The social reasoning mechanism (SRM) (Sichman et al., 1998; Gaspar et al., 2000; 
Sichman et al., 2001) has opened its way for forming the dynamic coalition by identifying 
whom a particular agent is going to depend on and vice versa. In addition, it has introduced 
several types of dependence relationships such as (1) OR-Dependence, (2) AND-Dependence, 
and (3) CO-Dependence. One of the most significant developments of SRM is the visualization 
of the dependence network between agents into dependence graph. It offers researchers an 
easier modelling of the agents’ dependence. Utilizing the dependence graph, we can represent 
the coalition formation in graph and further investigate the relationship and reason of coalition 
formation fails. Some researchers (e.g. An, Miao, & Cheng, 2005a; An, Miao, Tang, Li, & 
Cheng, 2005c; An et al., 2007) have also shown a transitive dependence relationship when 
forming a coalition between agents that can be applied in manufacturing field.
To the authors’ knowledge, despite the formalization of transitive dependence, not much 
research has been done in this field. Furthermore, there is no standard software or tools that 
support the transitive dependence based coalition formation. To this end, the T-DepExp 
system has been proposed to simulate the transitive dependence between agents to form 
coalition. The design of the T-DepExp system is based on the original concept introduced 
by An and his colleagues (An et al., 2005a; An et al., 2005c; An et al., 2007) and we have 
introduced the extendibility into the T-DepExp system for future development of mechanism 
and experiments. The T-DepExp system aims to develop an alternate mechanism for forming 
transitive dependence based a coalition that encourages the indirect cooperation between 
agents in problem solving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, the related work of the T-DepExp 
system is introduced in Section II. Subsequently in Section III, the concept and architecture 
of the T-DepExp system are explained for running the experiments on transitive dependence 
based coalition formation. In Section IV, the experimental setup and results as well as the 
analysis are presented based on the observation. The conclusion of the T-DepExp system and 
future works are presented in the last section.
RELATED WORK
The literature review related to the T-DepExp system is presented in this section. It consists 
of (1) Coalition formation, (2) social reasoning mechanism based coalition, and (3) transitive 
dependence.
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Coalition Formation
Coalition is a type of dynamic organization in MAS which is goal-directed group for agents 
to form cooperation. It is a short-lived group that is formed and dissolved when it is no longer 
needed (Horling & Lesser, 2004). Coalition Formation (CF) is often viewed by researchers as 
an optimization problem of MAS’ cooperation. The need for forming coalition is based on the 
limited capability of the agent itself to achieve the required specific goals. Hence, the agent will 
depend on other agents to fulfil the required capability to achieve its goals. This phenomenon is 
known as social needs or dependence theories that are presented in some papers (Castelfranchi, 
1998; Sichman et al., 1998). An example of the coalition formation is shown in Figure 1.
 The dotted circles in Fig.1 represent the coalition boundary, while the bold dots represent 
agents in the society. One problem of the coalition is that the possibility of overlapping issues 
occurs during CF, as shown in Fig. 1. This suggests that an agent can join more than one 
coalition in parallel.
CF is originated from the game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) and has been widely 
studied for its dynamic formation of group. It is also known as coalitional game. Organization 
such as coalition is suitable for tackling the open multi-agent system (OMAS). OMAS is the 
MAS societies that have high dynamic elements and they require agents to be hyper-adaptive. 
There are a few payment configurations developed along with the coalition such as (1) Shapley 
Value (Shapley, 1953), (2) Kernel (Morton & Michael, 1967), and (3) Core (Klusch & Gerber, 
2002). The payment configurations aim to distribute the profit of the coalition to all the agents 
involved. It may vary depending on the element the payment configuration emphasises on such 
as fairness, uniqueness, and consistency.
Social Reasoning Mechanism Based Coalition
Social reasoning mechanism (Sichman et al., 1998; Gaspar et al., 2000; Sichman, et al., 
2001) (SRM) was developed to assist an agent to reason about other agents in the MAS 
society. SRM is based on the dependence theory that proposes the social need of an agent 
and is required to depend on other agents. The SRM relieves the communication flow 
between agents by identifying them using the social reasoning. This mechanism helps an 
agent to achieve a given goal by reasoning about other agents in two different social views 
(Sichman et al., 2001): (1) Whom do I depend and (2) Who depends on me. The dependence 
Fig.1: Example of the coalitions in MAS
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relationships show the relationship of an agent depending on other agents to achieve its goal 
using the required capabilities. The dependence relationship formed can be classified into: (1) 
AND-Dependence, (2) OR-Dependence, and (3) Single-Dependence. The three fundamental 
dependence relationships in the proposed T-DepExp system are described in Table 1 below:
TABLE 1: Type of the Dependence Relationship
Type of Dependence 
Relationship
Explanation
OR-Dependence This relationship indicates that agent has option of choosing agent to 
cooperate for achieving its goals.
AND-Dependence This relationship indicates that agent would have to take account all party of 
agents since all agent are required for achieving the goal.
Single-Dependence
This relationship indicates the agent only has a single option in choosing the 
partner for achieving its goal.
On the other hands, OR-Dependence, AND-Dependence and Single-Dependence can be 
expressed in a mathematical form:
 ● AND-Dependence
AND_Dep(Agtj,agtIpqk)=∀agk∈ G(agtk)¬aaut (agtl,gk pqk)∧∀im(pqk) ∈I(pqk)am∈  
       An(agti,gk,pqk)(∃!Agtk ∈ AG |Agt| = ∃agtl ∈ Agtk)basic_dep(agti, agtl,gkpqk, am)∨
∃!Agtk∈AgjOR_dep(agti,Agk,am)∧¬∃AGmAGj⊂AGmAND_dep(agtl,AGm,gk,pqk)  
         (1)




        ∈Agtj basic_dep(agti,agtl,gk,pqk,am)∧¬∃AgtmAgtj⊂Agtm
              OR_Dep(agti,Agtm,gk,pqk,am)      (2)
 ●  Single-Relationship
  Single_dep(agti,agtj,pqk,gk) ≡ ∃gk∈(agti,gk,pqk)∧∀Agtl∈
   Agtjbasic_dep(agti,agtl,pqk,am)∧∃AgtmAgtj, ⊂ AgtmOR_dep(agti,Agtm,gk, pqk,am) 
          (3)
Other related works of SRM include identifying four structural viewpoints (Boella, Sauro, 
& Torre, 2004) of an agent in a coalition such as: (1) power view, (2) mind view, (3) coalition 
view, and (4) dependence view. SRM also has its place in social exchange (Rodrigues & Costa, 
2003; Rodrigues, Costa, & Bordini, 2003) that exchanges value introduced to support the social 
interactions between agents. It is based on the algebra of exchange values that the structural 
value of storing and manipulating is done by modifying SRM. In addition, we also reviewed 
the work of Lau, Singh and Tan (2012) on the dependence graph of agents with SRM in our 
previous works.
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Transitive Dependence Relationship
The transitive dependence is an indirect dependence between the agents in the society that is 
introduced by An and his colleagues (An et al., 2005c; An et al., 2007). They have shown a 
possible indirect dependence relationship between agents using SRM.
The transitive dependence is based on the dependence chain that the starting agent (also 
known as head) will connect to an ending agent of the chain (known as tail) by a series of 
connected agents sharing the same goal to achieve. Fig.2 shows the example of the transitive 
dependence relationship based the coalition formed:
Fig.2: Example of Transitive Dependence
From Fig. 2, the transitive dependence relationship for the agents in the cooperation 
can be expressed as dep = TDep(agto, agt5,depchain), where depchain = agto    pg01,a2 → 
agt2     pgO2,a5→  agt6.. Transitive dependence relationship is proven (An et al., 2005a; An et 
al., 2007) to encourage agents to help each other regardless of the profits gained from the 
direct dependence. The main concept behind the transitive dependence is indirect profitable 
cooperation that will lead to overall profitable cooperation among the agents.
Other related works of transitive dependence include the application of transitive 
dependence into virtual organization (An, Miao, Shen, Miao, & Cheng, 2005b). This application 
includes service discovery and partner-searching features using transitive dependence based 
reasoning. However, the auto-complete knowledge of an agent in the transitive dependence 
shows an agent has a complete knowledge regarding itself, which is impractical.
T-DEPEXP SYSTEM
In this section, we have proposed the T-DepExp system for simulating the transitive dependence 
between agents in coalition. The concept of the T-DepExp system is explained in the first sub-
section. Subsequently, the system design of the T-DepExp system is presented and explained. 
The parameters for conducting the experiments are explained in the last sub-section.
Concept of T-DepExp System
T-DepExp system is a MABS software that aims to provide alternate payoff mechanism 
to CF other than Shapley value, core and kernel. The Shapley value is the most popular 
payoff mechanism since it offers fair payment to all agents involved in coalition formation. 
However, the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) has a higher computation complexity since it 
involves permutation and factorial when calculating payoff (also known as utility) for each 
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agent. The core (Klusch et al., 2002) suggests that agents do not need to have unique payoff 
configurations when forming coalition. However, searching for core optimal coalition structure 
is computationally difficult. The kernel (Morton et al., 1967) introduces stable payment 
configuration where there is an equilibrium between the agents in the coalition. The main 
drawback of the kernel is that it cannot guarantee parento optimal condition where all agents 
are getting equal paid for joining the coalition.
For explanation of the transitive dependence based coalition example, the coalition formed 
with three agents shown in Fig. 2 is considered. This coalition has a centralized view as we will 
call agent, agto, as a root agent to form coalition and agent agt5 as the leaf agent where there 
is no more “potential child” to invite for forming a coalition. Similar concepts are applied in 
the T-DepExp System as the programme reaches leaf agent and when there is no more child 
to invite to join the coalition, it is considered that no more coalition will be formed. In the 
T-DepExp System, however, the coalition of  n-size will be tested that wishes to able to handle 
larger group of agents.
Together with the T-DepExp system, the authors aimed to create an alternate payoff 
mechanism based on the concept of budgets. The main purposes of designing encourage the 
cooperation between the agents. Assume that all the agents in the society are applying the 
sincerity principles, the agent that has higher cost in the society will have a lower chance of 
involving into coalition formation. Through the development of budget mechanism, the agents 
will have equal chance of involving into the coalition to earn profits. If the cost is within the 
budget requirement, the coalition will then be formed, giving the chance to other agents to 
involve into the coalition.
The T-DepExp system attempts to address the issue of the transitive dependence based 
coalition which is useful in three-tier systems. It includes the n number of middle-man for 
forming the cooperation. Most MABS tools available emphasize on direct dependence between 
agents. The motivation of the T-DepExp System is an attempt to address indirect dependence 
between the agents. This enables them to have a larger perspective of their cooperation instead 
of their first-person’s view.
The Proposed T-DepExp System Architecture
In this sub-section, the architecture of the T-DepExp Systems is proposed. It shares some 
common features of the ASIC Model (Boissier & Demazeau, 1994) proposed by Boissier and 
his colleagues. The fundamental composition of this architecture is the external description of 
the agents. By introducing the external description, we can address our agent architecture using 
belief, desire and intention (BDI) architecture (Wooldridge, 2009). The BDI architecture which 
represents the agents in the MAS society are able to reason, have their own trust towards other 
entities and goals to achieve. Fig.3 shows the architecture of the T-DepExp system.
The T-DepExp system is constructed with the external mechanism for assisting the agent 
to make a better decision and give reasoning about the environment and social status. The main 
focus of the T-DepExp system is simulating the transitive type dependence during CF. Hence, 
SRM and social evaluation module play an important role here for the agents to analyze their 
social status.
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The T-DepExp system has a robust learning module that learns based on the outcome of 
their decision. It will learn based on the outcome of the transitive dependence based coalition. 
The plan generator will generate plan for the agent after the learning module is invoked. 
Meanwhile, the communication module serves as a medium for the agents to communicate 
among themselves. The T-DepExp system architecture consists of trust module, where 
credibility of the agent is given attention here. It is to mitigate any malicious agent to cheat on 
the agents’ profit. Nonetheless, it is not guaranteed that the agent will avoid the cheating issue 
completely. Hence, the trust model implemented here is using the reputation and confidence 
(Ramchurn, Sierra, Godó, & Jennings, 2003). The Reputation model suggests that the agent 
will gain trust if friends of an ally have received positive feedbacks from other agents.
The T-DepExp systems was developed using JAVA programming language. It offers 
cross-platform compatibility to execute the programme. Hence, it has become the choice of 
the programming language. It was designed with object-oriented concept in mind incorporate 
iterative waterfall model lifecycle. One major focus of this program is the extendibility of the 
new mechanism implementation. The mechanism that uses external description will run well 
with the T-DepExp system.
Figure 3: The architecture of the T-DepExp Systems
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Parameters Input and Hypothesis
The T-DepExp System requires certain input for generating the outcome of CF. The society 
of MAS is randomized based on the setting for getting un-bias results. For the experimental 
setup in this study, Table 2 depicts the parameters to be input for running the simulation of 
transitive dependence based CF:
TABLE 2: Parameters for Inputing into Simulations
Parameters Descriptions
n Number of agents in the society
Ρa Probability / Ratio of agent having an action to achieve the goal assigned.
 Ρand
AND Ratio of the relationship occurred when requiring the action/resource from 
other agents.
 Ρor
OR Ratio of the relationship occurred when requiring the action/resource from 
other agents.
v Budget value that are allocated for coalition formation.
i The payout for accepting the coalition invitation
 imax The maximum payout for agent to propose for the value per each action.
imin The minimum payout for agent to propose for the value per each action.
The T-DepExp system emphasizes on the searching ideal amount of budget for an agent to 
form transitive dependence coalition. Below are the hypotheses for the experiments conducted 
with the T-DepExp System to adapt budget mechanism and calculate a suitable budget for 
forming a feasible coalition.
 ● Hypothesis 1: Optimal amount of budget encourage the cooperation of the agent to 
form coalition (until an optimal budget is reached).
The amount of budget serves as a threshold to the size of coalition that an agent wants 
to perform. If the amount of budget is optimal, the coalition can be formed regardless of the 
number of agents in the coalition. It ensures that every agent in the coalition will obtain profit 
through the cooperation with other agents. Hence, it is believed that the optimal amount of 
budget will encourage the cooperation of agents in the transitive dependence based coalition.
 ● Hypothesis 2: Bad planning (relationship ratio increase) will decrease cooperation 
between agents.
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The incremental of the relationship ratio suggests the dependence relationship between 
agents in the coalition increases. It increases the computational time to traverse through the 
dependence relationship. In addition, the coalition value will increase and tend not to meet 
the allocated budget for CF. Hence, the rate of the cooperation will go down. Hypothesis 2 is 
indirectly opposite of Hypothesis 1 for the rate of cooperation. Hence, the incremental of the 
relationship ratio will decrease the rate of cooperation between the agents.
 ● Hypothesis 3: Higher OR-Dependence ratio will decrease the computational time of 
CF in the T-DepExp system.
The ratio of the OR-Dependence will have an impact on the CF computational time. It is 
believed that a higher ratio of OR-Dependence will yield more alternate choices for agents to 
choose. This is in contrast with the AND-Dependence ratio, where the agent is not required 
to consider all the agents in the dependence relationship. Hence, it is assumed that a higher 
ratio of the OR-Dependence will form the transitive dependence based coalition in a shorter 
computation time than the AND-Dependence.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the experiment of the T-DepExp system is conducted and the analysis of the 
results is discussed based on the observation. The performance measurement of the experiments 
is discussed in the first sub-section. Subsequently, the results of the experiments are displayed. 
Lastly, the last sub-section includes the discussion on the results and observation.
Performance Measurements 
For the T-DepExp system, the authors have included their own measurements for the CF in the 
T-DepExp system. It aims to test the efficiency of the new implementation of the mechanism 
and algorithm for future upgrades. The performance measure for conducting this experiment 
is shown in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3: Performance Measurement
Measurements Descriptions
Ntotal The number of coalition that is successfully formed per simulation.
 Btotal The budget in term of utility for forming coalition.
Vc The value for the coalition formation.
Vaverage The average of the coalition formation for multiple simulations.
Rc The profit that gained for forming the coalition.
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RESULTS
The simulation of the T-DepExp System was conducted using the computer with the 
specifications of Intel Xeon processor and 16GB RAM. The dataset to be inputted into the 
simulation were randomly generated during initialization of the simulation. The focus of 
the simulation was to obtain a suitable budget for supporting budget mechanism in forming 
transitive based coalition. Also, the cooperation rate between agents was also tested in the 
simulations of the T-DepExp system. Table 4 shows the results of the simulation.
TABLE 4: Result for Simulating for Agent Size of 10
As the relationship ratio goes higher, agents tend to have dependence chain that ends up 
in a loop (dead lock) where the coalition formation is not feasible. The increase in the AND-
Dependence ratio does not affect the feasibility of the coalition formation much, except for 
computation time. Fig. 4 shows the total value of the coalition formed with a society size of 
10 agents and the basic payout of 40 and 60.
Fig.4: Ratio of AND-Dependence, Ρand and average payout of an agent Vaverage 
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There is some noise during the process of CF as there may be some “deadlock” issues. The 
main reason is the data for this experiment are generated randomly. The authors intentionally 
include this particular constraint in the experiment as it will add a dynamic element to the 
simulation. The graph in Figure 4 shows a running series of the simulation that considers 
multiple randomized datasets. Based on the simulation results, a few observations can be 
deduced, as follows: 
 ● Observation 1: The increment in the AND-Dependence ratio Ρand causes the coalition 
formation to fail easily.
The increment of the AND-Dependence ratio Ρand shows that the agent has to consider all 
the agents engaged in the dependence relationship. There are two fail outcomes of CF which 
include: (1) insufficient budget to form coalition and (2) agents refuse to cooperate and there 
are no alternative options. The AND-Dependence relationship has a strict condition for the 
dependence relationship that all agents in the dependence relationship have to agree to join 
the coalition. If one of the agents rejects the offer, the CF will fail easily. The budget v has a 
major influence on CF as it holds the threshold for it. If the budget v is insufficient, CF will 
fail instantly. Fig. 4 and Table 4 have shown the increment of the AND-Dependence ratio   Ρand 
will cause CF to fail easily. This observation has been shown in Hypothesis 2.
 ● Observation 2: The increment of the relation ratio Ρa causes CF to fail easily.
The increment of the relation ratio Ρa indicates the number of dependence relationships 
in the coalition increases. The relationship includes the number of AND-Dependence and 
OR-Dependence in the process of CF. The increase in the dependence relationships indicates 
that the coalition is much harder to form due to the complexity of the relationship. Hence, the 
CF process has a tendency to fail. An observation of Table 4 shows that the relation ratio Ρa 
= 2.0   consists of eight failed attempts of CF. By comparing the relation ratio Ρa = 2.0 and 
relation ratio  Ρa = 1.0, the failure rate can be easily distinguished based on the relation ratio. 
By concluding Observation 2, Hypothesis 1 has shown the influence of the relation ratio Ρa 
towards successful CF.
 ● Observation 3: The ratio of OR-Dependence Ρor encourages the coalition formation 
in the society.
The ratio of OR-Dependence Ρa shows increasing chances of an agent to choose an 
optimal partner. The increment of the OR-Dependence ratio Ρa  shows that the ratio of AND-
Dependence Ρand decreases. As the ratio of AND-Dependence Ρand increases in Figure 4, CF 
tends to fail easily. This situation can be denoted as the AND-Dependence consume majority 
of the budget v  to maintain the stability of the coalition. Due to limited budget, the CF will fail 
as the budget for the allocation is insufficient. This is on the contrary to the AND-Dependence 
scenario, where the increment of the OR-Dependence ratio  Ρor has a higher rate of CF. Agents 
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can sorely depend on the most convenient agent for CF. Hence, the computational complexity of 
the OR-Dependence will be low as compared to the AND-Dependence. Based on the analysis 
above, we can denote that Hypothesis 3 is proven.
CONCLUSION
T-DepExp system has become the framework for developing the budget mechanism in providing 
a better mechanism for transitive based coalition formation. It has been proven to generate 
feasible coalition with various numbers of budgets, where traditional method such as the 
Shapley value does not perform well in large-scale society. In searching of an ideal formula 
for expressing the required budget for the transitive dependence based coalition, various types 
of simulation and extensions will be implemented for future work.
 In future agenda, the T-DepExp system will simulate CF based on an optimal budget in 
order to form feasible coalitions. The authors will define the calculation of the cost for each 
action requiring other agents’ capabilities. Furthermore, algorithm that enables the T-DepExp 
system to adapt to dynamic environment can be implemented anytime in the simulation.
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